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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-SIGNIFICANCE OF
TESTIMONY CONSTITUTES A FACTOR IN DETERMINING RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION. Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858
(1986).
On November 11, 1982, Stanley and Susan Lackey drove fifteen-
year-old Theresa Baraque to a secluded location where they allegedly
raped her. A doctor who examined Theresa after the incident testified
at the Lackeys' trial as to what Theresa had told him about the details
of the rape. The doctor also testified about Theresa's physical and
mental condition during the examination. The Lackeys were convicted
of rape. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the conviction and or-
dered a new trial.1
During the interval between the Lackeys' initial conviction and the
retrial, the doctor who had examined Theresa and testified at the first
trial moved out of state. While preparing for the second trial, the State
attempted to locate the doctor by contacting the hospital where he had
previously worked. When this proved unsuccessful, the State contacted
various clinics where he might have relocated. Eventually, the State
located the doctor in Birmingham, Alabama. At first he indicated a
desire to return for the second trial; however, when it was too late for
compulsory measures, he changed his mind. Unable to secure the doc-
tor's presence at the retrial, the State had his testimony read from the
transcript of the first trial.
The jury convicted the Lackeys a second time, sentencing Stanley
to forty years in prison and Susan to ten years. The Lackeys appealed,
contending that the use of the transcript of the doctor's prior testimony
violated their sixth amendment right of confrontation.
The Arkansas Supreme Court again reversed the convictions. The
court held that the reading of the prior testimony to the jury violated
the Lackeys' sixth amendment right of confrontation, since the witness'
prior testimony was extensive and significant, and since the State had
failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the witness was unavailable.
Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986).
The right of confrontation originated at common law, long before
the sixth amendment.2 The purpose of confrontation at common law
I. Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 671 S.W.2d 759 (1984).
2. F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951).
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was two-fold. First, and most importantly, the right of confrontation
was designed to eliminate hearsay testimony by allowing cross-exami-
nation of witnesses.3 Second, it allowed judges and juries to observe the
witness' demeanor while testifying, enabling them to weigh his credibil-
ity more effectively.
4
Although the right of confrontation appeared absolute, there were
exceptions. The most notable exception was that former testimony,
which had been subject to cross-examination and taken in the presence
of the accused, could be used if the witness was dead or otherwise un-
available.5 The common law also allowed exceptions for dying declara-
tions, testimony of witnesses who later became insane, and instances in
which the accused prevented the witness from testifying.'
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution insures
that the accused in criminal prosecutions enjoys the right to confront
the witnesses against him.7 Almost all state constitutions embody this
same principle of confrontation for criminal prosecutions. 8 These provi-
sions in the state constitutions were necessary because the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution did not apply to the states.9
Early interpretations of the sixth amendment, and of similar provi-
sions in state constitutions, indicated that the aim of these provisions
was to secure the rights that existed at common law for citizens of the
United States.10 In Mattox v. United States" the Supreme Court made
it clear that the Court was bound to interpret the Constitution in the
light of the law that existed at the time of its adoption.
The Court in Mattox discussed the common law exceptions for
dying declarations and prior testimony. It pointed out that the primary
objective of the constitutional provision was to prevent depositions from
being used against the accused in place of personal examination and
cross-examination.' 2 The Court held that a witness' testimony from a
previous trial is admissible if, due to his death, the witness is unavaila-
3. 5 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
4. Id.
5. C. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 253 (3d ed. 1984).
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1397 n.I.
9. West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262 (1904), overruled, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1895); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); State v. Mc O'Blenis, 24 Mo.
416 (1857); Lambreth v. State, 23 Miss. 32 (1852).
II. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
12. Id. at 242-43.
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ble at a later trial.' 3
The Court, in Reynolds v. United States,4 applied another com-
mon law exception to the constitutional right of confrontation. The
Court stated that the Constitution does not protect a defendant from
an absent witness' earlier testimony if the witness is absent due to the
defendant's wrongful actions.' 6 However, if the witness is absent due to
the negligence of the prosecution rather than the defendant's actions,
his earlier testimony is not admissible.' 6
The early cases illustrate that the Court's focus concerning the
confrontation clause is on cross-examination. Prior testimony of a de-
ceased or absent witness was almost always admitted in criminal prose-
cutions when the right of cross-examination had been satisfied at the
prior trial or deposition. 7 This rule applied not only in cases involving
interpretation of the sixth amendment, but also in the states' interpre-
tations of their own constitutional provisions.' 8
The right of confrontation remained relatively unchanged until
1965, when the Supreme Court held in Pointer v. Texas 9 that the
sixth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. The Court stated that the right of cross-examination,
which is associated with confrontation, is an essential and fundamental
requirement for a fair trial.20 Because of the fundamental nature of the
right of confrontation, the Court in Pointer held that the right was
violated when testimony was used from a preliminary hearing in which
the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness.2 ' The
fundamental right of confrontation is also violated when the prosecu-
tion introduces out-of-court statements of a witness who was not sub-
ject to cross-examination. 2 This right applies even though the witness
is present at trial but refuses to be cross-examined.23
Although the Court in Pointer held that the right of confrontation
is a fundamental and essential requirement for a fair trial,24 it has al-
13. Id. at 244.
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Id. at 158.
16. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900).
17. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1398.
18. Id. at 186 n.4.
19. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
20. Id. at 405.
21. Id. at 407.
22. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
23. Id.
24. 380 U.S. at 405.
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lowed exceptions to the right in cases involving prior testimony.25 In
Barber v. Page2 6 the Court stated that for a witness' prior testimony to
fall within an exception to the confrontation clause, the State must
prove that the witness is unavailable. The Court explained in Califor-
nia v. Green27 that once the witness has been shown to be unavailable,
the trial court should examine the testimony for indicia of reliability.
Only when both of these requirements have been met will the Court
allow an exception to the confrontation clause.28
The Court's decision in Barber established that the mere absence
of the witness from the jurisdiction is not sufficient to show that the
witness is unavailable. 29 The Court stated that the State must make a
good faith effort to obtain the witness' presence at trial before he will
be deemed unavailable.30 The Court later stated in Ohio v. Roberts"1
that the lengths to which the State must go to produce a witness is a
question of reasonableness.
A witness, whose location in another state is known, is not unavail-
able unless the State makes an attempt to secure his presence, using
compulsory measures if necessary. 32 On the other hand, a witness
whose location is known to be in another country may be deemed to be
unavailable without requiring futile attempts by the State to produce
him.3" If a witness is thought to be in another state, but his location is
unknown, a good faith effort by the State to locate the witness is
sufficient.34
Even if a witness is unavailable, his statement will not be admissi-
ble unless it bears adequate indicia of reliability.3 5 The Court in Rob-
erts stated that reliability can be inferred in a case in which the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.36 However, in
25. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
26. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
27. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (testimony from a
preliminary hearing that was subject to cross-examination bore sufficient indicia of reliability to
be admissible).
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 204.
29. 390 U.S. at 722.
30. Id. at 724.
31. 448 U.S. at 74, (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 789 n.22 (1970)).
32. Barber, 390 U.S. at 724.
33. See Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 211.
34. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
35. Id.
36. 448 U.S. at 57.
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Dutton v. Evans,3 7 the Court rejected the idea that the confrontation
clause is nothing more than the codification of the hearsay rule.
The purpose of the search for indicia of reliability is to assure a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of a prior statement.3 8 In its
analysis of reliability, the Court has focused on whether the defendant
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the prior state-
ment was given.39 A statement made at a preliminary hearing or for-
mer trial, with an adequate opportunity and motive for cross-examina-
tion, will be considered reliable if its maker becomes unavailable.40 The
Court has also examined other factors affecting reliability, including
personal knowledge of the witness, the role of the defendant, and
whether the witness had a motive to lie.
1
Arkansas historically has equated confrontation with cross-exami-
nation.4 2 It is also well settled in Arkansas that the right of confronta-
tion may be dispensed with when a witness, who is unavailable, has
given testimony that is reliable.4
3
The Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted the United States Su-
preme Court's requirement of a good-faith effort to secure the presence
of a witness before he is deemed to be "unavailable."" In Satterfield v.
State the Arkansas Supreme Court held that because the State failed
to contact a witness whose location was known, it had not made a good
faith effort to obtain his presence.' 6 Similarly, a lack of a good faith
effort was found in Looper v. State,'6 when the State obtained a sub-
poena but failed to make any attempt to follow up on it.
The unavailable witness' testimony must also be reliable. In Scott
v. State the court held that reliability, in the case of testimony from a
previous trial or preliminary hearing, depends on the circumstances
surrounding the taking of the testimony.47 The court in Scott held that
37. 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
38. Green, 399 U.S. at 165.
39. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 216. In his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1129-35 (1986), Justice Marshall pointed out that there is a split
of opinion concerning what constitutes "indicia of reliability." He noted that some courts require
an assessment of the circumstances of each statement, while others hold that any statement ad-
mitted under FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E) qualifies as reliable.
40. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73.
41. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
42. Smith v. State, 200 Ark. 1152, 143 S.W.2d 190 (1940).
43. Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 92, 612 S.W.2d 110, 112 (1981); Satterfield v. State, 248
Ark. 395, 398, 451 S.W.2d 730, 732 (1970).
44. Scott, 272 Ark. at 92, 612 S.W.2d at 112.
45. 248 Ark. at 400, 451 S.W.2d at 733.
46. 270 Ark. 376, 605 S.W.2d 490 (Ark. App. 1980).
47. 272 Ark. at 93, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
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testimony taken at a preliminary hearing was reliable when a motive
and opportunity existed to develop that prior testimony through cross-
examination."8 The court also examined other factors affecting reliabil-
ity that have been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court.49
In 1980 the Arkansas Supreme Court in Holloway v. State"0 devi-
ated from the accepted standards of availability and reliability. The
court justified this deviation by its characterization of the witness' testi-
mony as not critical. 1 The court in Holloway allowed the absent wit-
ness' testimony to be used, even though the State had failed to make a
good faith effort to produce hiri. 2
In Lackey v. State Justice Newbern began the Arkansas Supreme
Court's analysis by noting that the State conceded that it did not make
a good faith effort to obtain the doctor's presence at the second trial.53
This concession saved the court the necessity of determining whether or
not the witness was available. The court then compared Lackey with
the factually similar case of Holloway."'
The court noted that in Holloway the doctor who examined the
victims had moved out of the state after testifying in the first trial. The
State was unable to locate him in time to compel him to testify at the
second trial.55 The court determined that the State did not make a
good faith effort to secure the witness' presence.6" The court concluded,
however, that the doctor's testimony was not critical. Therefore, its use
at the second trial was harmless error. 57 The court in Holloway also
stated that the confrontation clause is not absolute and does not require
that a criminal defendant be confronted by each witness against him
every time he is tried. 8
The court in Lackey distinguished Holloway by concentrating on
the extent and significance of the doctor's testimony. 59 In Holloway the
48. Id. at 95, 612 S.W.2d at 114.
49. Id. at 94-95, 612 S.W.2d at 113. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) vacated in
part, 408 U.S. 938 (1972).
50. 268 Ark. 24, 594 S.W.2d 2 (1980).
51. Id. at 28, 594 S.W.2d at 4.
52. Id.
53. 288 Ark. 225, 226, 703 S.W.2d 858, 859 (1986).
54. Id. at 227, 703 S.W.2d at 859-860 (citing Holloway v. State, 268 Ark. 24, 594 S.W.2d 2
(1980)).
55. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 227, 703 S.W.2d at 859 (citing Holloway, 268 Ark. at 28-29, 594
S.W.2d at 4).
56. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 227, 703 S.W.2d at 859.
57. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 227, 703 S.W.2d at 860 (citing Holloway, 268 Ark. at 28-29 594
S.W.2d at 4).
58. Holloway, 268 Ark, at 28-29, 594 S.W.2d at 4.
59. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 227-28, 703 S.W.2d at 860.
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doctor merely testified that the women had recently had sex. In Lackey
the doctor testified not only about the alleged victim's physical and
mental condition during the examination but also about what she had
told him concerning the rape.60
The court in Lackey indicated that the right of confrontation is a
trial right." It stated that this witness' testimony was so significant
that the jury, which was to decide the defendants' fate, should have
observed the witness' demeanor while testifying. 2 The court then held
that the reading of the testimony to the jury violated the defendants'
right of confrontation, since the State's showing of the witness' unavail-
ability was insufficient and the witness' prior testimony was
significant.0 3
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Hays examined the State's efforts
to locate the witness.04 He determined that the State did act in good
faith, even though it was too late to use compulsory process when the
witness decided not to return.65 In Justice Hays' opinion, the confessed
lack of good faith was more tacit than real, and was made only in
reliance on the precedent set in Holloway." Justice Hays compared the
doctor's testimony in Holloway to that in Lackey. He concluded that
the testimony in Lackey was, due to its nature and extent, less damag-
ing to the defendants than that which was admitted in Holloway.67
Lackey is significant because it follows the path set in Holloway in
which the court based the right of confrontation on the importance of
the witness. The court in Holloway based the right of confrontation on
its own judgment of the witness' importance, rather than on the estab-
lished standards of availability and reliability. 6 This allowed the court
to use testimony that otherwise would have been inadmissible, since it
was determined that the State did not act in good faith to produce the
witness. In Lackey the State relied on Holloway and admitted that it
had not made a good faith effort to locate the witness, believing that
the testimony would be allowed anyway. " If the State had not relied
upon Holloway, but had proven that the witness was unavailable, the
60. Id.
61. Id. at 228, 703 S.W.2d at 860 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).
62. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 228, 703 S.W.2d at 860.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 230, 703 S.W.2d at 861 (Hays, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 229, 703 S.W.2d at 861.
67. Id.
68. Holloway, 268 Ark. at 24, 594 S.W.2d at 2.
69. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 229, 703 S.W.2d at 861.
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result in Lackey should have been different. In Holloway the State
failed to prove that the witness was unavailable. Only after the court
found that the witness was available did it look at the importance of his
testimony. 0 Finding the witness unavailable in Lackey would have dis-
tinguished Holloway and allowed the court to examine the reliability of
the testimony.
7 1
In the dissenting opinion in Lackey, Justice Hays examined the
State's efforts and concluded that it did make a good faith effort to
obtain the witness' presence at the second trial. 72 The State's efforts in
Lackey were more comprehensive than in other cases in which the
court found a lack of a good faith effort.73 Therefore, had the State not
confessed a lack of a good faith effort, the witness probably would have
been found to be unavailable.
A finding that the witness was unavailable in Lackey would have
allowed the State to use his testimony because it contained sufficient
indicia of reliability.7 4 The witness testified at the first trial, and the
defendants had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine him.
Although the majority in Lackey characterized confrontation as a
trial right,76 observations by a jury are merely a method of ensuring the
reliability of the testimony.7 6 Because the reliability of the witness in
Lackey was established through cross-examination and jury observation
at the first trial, observation at the second trial was unnecessary.
The court's decision in Lackey makes the right of confrontation
depend upon the court's judgment as to the importance of the witness'
testimony. In Lackey and Holloway, the witness' testimony was simi-
lar; yet, the court reached different conclusions.77 Rather than add this
additional subjective consideration to the confrontation issue, the court
should continue to use the traditional standards of availability and
reliability.
Brendan M. Donahue
70. Holloway, 268 Ark. at 28, 594 S.W.2d at 4.
71. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (even when declarant is unavailable, his
statement is admissible if it bears "indicia of reliability"); Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 612
S.W.2d 110 (1981) (state evidentiary rules can come within exception to right of confrontation if
witness is unavailable and evidence is reliable).
72. 288 Ark. at 230, 703 S.W.2d at 862 (Hays, J., dissenting).
73. See Holloway, 268 Ark. at 28-29, 594 S.W.2d at 4; Satterfield, 248 Ark. at 399, 451
S.W.2d at 733.
74. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Scott, 272 Ark. at 92, 612 S.W.2d at 113.
75. 288 Ark. at 228, 703 S.W.2d at 860 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)).
76. 5 J. WIGMORE. supra note 3, §§ 1395-99.
77. Lackey, 288 Ark. at 229, 703 S.W.2d at 861; Holloway, 268 Ark. 24, 594 S.W.2d 2.
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